



Ignore the vetoes, and forget about Coalitions of the Willing:
How the U.S. can achieve higher levels of foreign public
support for its military operations.
In the early 2000s, the US gained a great deal of foreign criticism over its military operations in
Iraq, and later, Afghanistan. But what determines whether the foreign public will support such
interventions? In new research which uses survey research based in Japan, Atsushi Tago finds
that the use of force in the Middle East by the US is most likely to be supported by foreigners
when it also has the approval of the United Nations Security Council, and that much of that
support continues even if the UN resolution is vetoed by Russia and China. Significantly, they
also find that when the US forms a friendly ‘Coalition of the Willing’, this does little to increase
foreign support for military actions.
In order to increase foreign public support for its military actions, the US government has often tried to obtain
supporting UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.  In recent survey research based in Japan, we find that not
only that UNSC resolutions increase levels of support, but also that resolutions which failed due to a Chinese or
Russian veto will still secure high levels of support for the use of force.  But if a draft resolution is withdrawn, then
public support falls. Foreign public opinion gives an ‘A’ for diplomatic effort when the US at least tries to pass a
resolution; self-withdrawal is the worst case for the US.
The US has also formed coalitions of friendly states in order to strengthen its overseas image.  A surprising finding
of our research is that these coalitions of the willing (i.e. multinational forces) do not significantly increase the
positive perception among the Japanese general public for American military action.
The United States cares a lot about how other states and its own people react to its military actions. Acting
proactively, in order to secure foreign public support for its military actions, the United States often seeks a UN
Security Council resolution and forms a coalition of the willing. Examples of such coalition military actions are the
Korean War and the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which were supported by UNSC resolutions and multinational forces
led by the United States. It has long been believed that endorsement by the UNSC and the involvement of
coalition troops increases levels of support by the general public for military action. However, evidence to support
the argument has been limited.
With Maki Ikeda of the University of Tokyo, I have conducted multiple survey experiments in Japan by using two
hypothetical scenarios of American ground and naval military operations in the Middle East. One scenario was
that a dictator in the fictitious oil-rich state of Country A had responded to a recent democracy movement by
ordering mass killings.  This led to refugees leaving the country, increased oil prices, and the destabilisation of the
entire Middle East region.  Survey respondents were told that the US had asked the UNSC to adopt a resolution to
“take all necessary measures” to stop the killing and restore peace and security. They were then asked whether
they supported such action on a 1 – 4 scale (one being “oppose” and 4 being “support”). Another scenario was
based on a fictitious act of piracy, which would lead to calls for a naval operation.
The reason we chose Japan as a field of the experiment is because of its famous peace constitution and its
overall anti-war sentiment.  We can reasonably make the assumption that the Japanese general public will have
lower levels of support for military action in general; therefore, if a UNSC resolution and coalition lead to a higher
level of support, it will be easier to see the difference in support levels than it would in other countries.  Also, it is
important to note that Japan is one of the most staunch allies for the US with the shared culture of liberal
democracy and open economy after World War II.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show our key findings. On the one hand, if the resolution was passed unanimously, passed
with abstentions, or even vetoed by Russia or China, levels of support for military action remained constant. On
the other hand, if the US withdrew its resolution, then levels of support diminished (see Figures I and II). 
Furthermore, as Figure III suggests, level of support increase notably if the UNSC gives its approval. Coalition
forces, however (i.e. operational multilateral (OM) military actions), do not significantly change Japanese
perceptions.
Figure 1: Level of Support for US Use of Force: counter-piracy operation scenario
Source: Authors (from our original journal article)
Figure 2: Level of Support for US Use of Force: regime-change operation scenario
Source: Authors (from our original journal article)
Figure 3: Level of Support for US Use of Force: Diplomacy (DM) versus Coalition (OM)
Note: DM means diplomatic multilateralism, where UNSC authorization exists, OM means
operational multilateralism, where multinational forces exists.
With our follow-up research as a part of the CROP-IT (Collaborative Research Of Political Information
Transmission) project funded by the Japan Society for Promotion of the Science (JSPS), we are finding out more
about the nature of UN approval; the latest survey experiment reveals that UN authorization changes the
perception of political legitimacy. However, it does not change Japanese public perception with regard to cost,
legality, expected duration of the use of force, or outcome of the military action. To generate friendly public opinion
in allied nations like Japan, it is important for the US government to avoid bypassing the UN Security Council from
the start and to make sustained efforts to garner the approval of the Council until it is either formally approved or
rejected. The US government could obtain better support when China and Russia cast their veto than when it
bypasses the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the general public in allied nations such as Japan may not be so
supportive to US military action simply because there are more flags. In particular, for Japanese audience, the UN
diplomatic process matters more to decide if they support American use of force than the number of flags behind
the US.
This article is based on the papers ‘An ‘A’ for Effort: Experimental Evidence on UN Security Council Engagement
and Support for US Military Action in Japan’, in the British Journal of Political Science, and “Winning over foreign
domestic support for use of force: power of diplomatic and operational multilateralism” in International Relations of
the Asia-Pacific.
Featured image credit: David Martyn Hunt (Flickr, CC-BY-2.0)
Please read our comments policy before commenting.  
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USApp– American Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.  
Shortened URL for this post:  http://bit.ly/1BM9oq8
______________________
About the author 
Atsushi Tago – Kobe University
Atsushi Tago is a professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of Law, Kobe
University (April 2015-). His main research interests are American use of force, scientific analysis
of military coalitions, multilateralism, and public diplomacy. His research has been appeared in
journals including Armed Forces and Society, British Journal of Political Science , Conflict
Management and Peace Science, International Relations of Asia-Pacific ,and Journal of Peace
Research. The author thanks the JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) and the
Suntory Foundation for financial aid for the research.
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 2014 LSE USAPP
